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Public debt was considered a reason of concern for many states. The 
problem became acute in the early ‘80s, when external debts ceased to be 
paid. Between 2001 and 2011, several developed countries were directly 
involved in external loans, because these investments could cover the bill 
for oil imports. The sovereign debt crisis is present not only in the 
European States, but in most countries experiencing high levels of 
indebtedness. Based on statistical data, the present paper highlights the 
roots, evolution and consequences of the public debt crisis in the EU, USA 
and Japan. 
Keywords: public debt, GDP, budget deficit 
1. HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC DEBT  
Public debt was considered a reason of concern for many states. This 
problem became acute in the early ‘80s, when the debt crisis spread in several 
countries, especially in Central and South America, which stopped paying 
external debts. 
After a thorough examination of the events that took place worldwide 
since the 1960s and especially after the first oil shock, developed countries had 
good reasons in lending large sums to countries requesting loans, notably those 
from Latin America. In other words, developed countries were directly interested 
in giving external loans because, through this measure, they could cover the bill 
for oil imports. Hence, extensive work has been initiated with regards to the 
recycling of Eurodollars and petrodollars. 
As Perkins (2006) boldly states, one notable example comes from the 
US: its “economic hit men” had the mission of convincing countries (important to 
the US from a strategic point of view) to accept enormous loans, usable for 
developing infrastructure and ensuring profitability for the US corporations. 
Ending up with staggering debts, such countries were controlled by the US and 
the World Bank. 
Public debt managers in countries with high debt levels should be aware 
of all the aspects with which deeply indebted countries had to struggle, in order 
not to repeat the same mistakes. Errors arising from adopting inappropriate debt 
policies – still faced by some countries – should be taken as harsh lessons by 
countries that have begun acquiring loans at a very brisk pace. 
Several times, a crisis which apparently did not seem to affect the global 
economy impacted not only the underdeveloped countries or developing 
economies, but also the global market. The stock mar et crash experience of 1929 
is still vivid in the minds of many, and the large-scale effects it had generated are 
not that remote. Moreover, the global crisis of 1929-1933 stands behind the 
creation of the International Monetary Fund. Structural adjustment policies began 
to be implemented after the debt crisis, as a response of governments within 
industrialized countries and international financial institutions losing control over 
poor countries. 
In the interval 1940-1960, with the development of Asian and African 
states after gaining independence, the expansion of the East European block, the 
triumph of the Chinese revolution, the Cuban and Algerian movements, emerging 
organizations generated international chaos, due to the dominance threat issued 
by major capitalist powers. 
The sovereign debt crisis was fueled both by the decrease in prices of 
products exported from least developed countries (LDCs) and the increase of the 
interest rate. As Toussaint (2000) pointed out, indebted countries announced their 
difficulties in repaying private debt, banks refused to guarantee new loans and 
demanded the old debt to be paid. The IMF and industrialized countries granted 
new loans, with the aim of allowing private banks to recover money and limit 
bankruptcy. Moreover, the IMF and the World Bank supported structural 
adjustment plans imposed on indebted countries.   
Great world debtors world during the Asian crisis were countries from 
Latin America and Africa, but also Central and Eastern Europe. The poorest and 
most indebted received the best treatment with respect to the repayment of 
foreign debt. This was known as the “Toronto improved conditions” and offered 
possibilities of reducing debt. Low-income countries applied “Houston 
conditions” and other debtor countries appealed to the “Paris Club Standard 
Conditions”. The latter countries have signed agreements with creditor banks, 
which allowed them to reduce external debt, reschedule the remaining debt, and 
in some cases, obtaining new loans. Countries signing such agreements were 
Costa Rica, Venezuela, Uruguay, Nigeria, Argentina, Jordan, Brazil, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Panama and Peru. 
The financial crisis deepened the problems of several European countries 
due to the monetary and financial structure of the Euro zone and the final 
outcome was an extreme liquidity shortage for European banks. During 2007-
2008, banks from the core Euro zone countries (Germany, France, The 
Netherlands, Belgium) continued to lend money to periph ral countries (Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, or PIIGS), totaling 1.5 trillion Euros in 2008, 
which exceeded three times the capital of core banks. Then, governments started 
defaulting on their debts. After the recovery from the global financial crisis and 
recession, a second wave of crises threatened: the sovereign debt crisis. 
As long as there are still countries barely over public debt (especially 
foreign debt), the public debt problem cannot be seen as solved. With respect to 
this, considerable efforts were supported by lending institutions, international 
financial institutions and borrowers to end this global problem. Erasing public 
debt is extremely important for poor countries, butalso for countries in which 
governments rejected austerity budgets, thus respecting their citizens’ will. In 
their view, it is necessary to give priority to human needs by abandoning 
structural adjustment policies, by reconstructing multiple control mechanisms and 
by redistributing capital. 
Regarding the evolution of public debt in the period 2002-2011, it can be 
noticed that Germany increased its indebtedness from 504 billion Euros (2007) to 
nearly 862 billion Euros. France and the UK recorded similar levels. Italy 
increased its indebtedness by more than 600 billion Euros, half of the sum during 
the crisis. Greece counts debts of 200 billion, Poland and Portugal are below 100 
billion. There are cases of countries where public debt grew almost exclusively 
since the financial crisis, namely Belgium, Finland, Ireland and the Netherlands. 
One of the rules to enter the Euro zone is ensuring that the total public 
debt should not exceed 60% of the GDP. The sovereign debt crisis SPREAD not 
only to the European States, but to most countries experiencing high levels of 
indebtedness. The crisis is more serious within the EU because there isn’t a 
unitary procedure to delay and mitigate such policy effects.  
In counterpart, the US budget deficit was more than 10% of GDP in 
2010, but it dropped almost to 6% of GDP in 2012. In Japan, the deficit rate 
amounted 9% of GDP in 2010 and slightly increased in the following year. The 
reason why US and Japan, though facing a sovereign debt crisis, do not have the 
same problems as EU members is that these two countries have monetary 
independence, i.e., when fiscal policy cannot be used, they turn to the monetary 
policy, printing money in order to refinance debt. 
 
2.  PUBLIC DEBT CRISIS IN ROMANIA   
Developing countries, including Romania, have accumulated public debt 
(especially foreign debt) during the postwar period, especially in the ‘70s-‘80s, 
and it has increased over time, especially since the 2007 global financial crisis 
started. 
In the early ‘80s, Romania’s access to foreign loans was considerably 
reduced. Consequently, the Minister of Finance (Gigea-Gorun, 2003, p.6) stated 
back then that, due to not paying loans at maturity, the country would be facing 
the situation of paying loans only partially. After his declaration, several deposits 
of the Romanian government from abroad bank accounts were fore closured by 
creditors, who could dispose of them as they wanted. Amid the onset of strong 
external debt crises worldwide, Romania ended up borrowing from foreign 
markets. By 1981, the volume of Romania’s foreign debt reached $13.9 million, 
without taking into account the $6 million in interest paid. In these circumstances, 
the only solution for Romania was to start negotiating with the IMF, Paris and 
London Clubs about rescheduling its external debt. 
If we refer to the volume of public debt registered by Romania in 2011, 
one can see it has constantly increased since the 1980s. During the whole period 
2002-2011, the only year when Romania reached the minimum debt level of 3.5% 
of GDP was 2006. Romania’s public debt has risen quite strongly since 2007. 
According to the Eurostat data, the debt had a level of €14763 million in 2007 
and €44675 million in 2012. Like other countries across the globe, Romania has 
not escaped the current debt crisis. 
 
3. PUBLIC DEBTS CRISIS IN EUROPE  
Started in 2007, the financial crisis has spread within the European 
Union, strongly affecting economies of member state. After a timid recovery in 
2010, the crisis deepened in 2011 and still continues nowadays. There are several 
reasons for the current situation: 1) states increased public debt, many of them in 
conditions of excessive liquidity and low interest rates; 2) increasing budget 
deficits trough various programs meant to stimulate the economy; 3) the recession 
forced governments to keep borrowing. According to Gust, Parpandel & 
Grigorescu (2012), the indebtedness level increased because markets were no 
longer willing to finance states. For the first time, due to indebtedness, many 
European governments were not able to intervene on the market by increasing 
budget deficits in order to combat the recession, as the public expected. Taking 
no action was out of the question, because it would have led to an uncontrolled 
decrease in the debt, generating huge job losses on the market. Blanchard and 
Giavazzi (2002) argued that budgetary deficits might not be a problem for the 
Euro zone, but they might be a problem for poorer countries which were 
registering an increasing consumption rate on the newly unified market.  
Recently, after 10 years of experience, Obstfeld (2012) goes against the 
two abovementioned authors. In his opinion, countries with increasing budget 
deficits might also face liquidity problems, both external and internal (resulting 
from massive capital withdrawals by residents). Regarding the external factors 
generating a liquidity crisis, one of them might be th  large variance in traded 
shares and financial derivatives. Because banks cannot recapitalize in due time, 
they are forced to borrow from outside the country, thus public debt. 
In his article, Blundell-Wignall (2012) argues that one of the important 
features of the sovereign debt crisis is the extensiv  phenomenon of financial 
contagion. This phenomenon represents a serious problem for Europe, found in a 
poor fiscal condition due to the lack of fiscal cons lidation. Thus, contagion 
could have a much higher expansion rate and generate the increase public debt 
rates. 
The present study analyzes the public debt evolution of EU member 
states (EU27). With the EU, the uncontrolled growth of public debt is considered 
to be the main reason for which investors sanction European countries and 
maintain a climate defined by lack of confidence in the financial markets. During 
the financial crisis, government spending increased considerably due to the effort 
of stabilizing the financial system and stimulating the economy. One consequence 
was a sharp decrease in fiscal revenues. Higher expenses generated budget 
deficits or deepened existing deficits.  
 
Table 1 
Budget deficits within the EU 
GEO/TIME 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
European Union -2.6 -3.2 -2.9 -2.5 -1.5 -0.9 -2.4 -6.9 -6.5 -4.4 
Belgium -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -2.5 0.4 -0.1 -1.0 -5.5 -3.8 -3.7 
Bulgaria -1.2 -0.4 1.9 1.0 1.9 1.2 1.7 -4.3 -3.1 -2.0 
Czech Republic -6.5 -6.7 -2.8 -3.2 -2.4 -0.7 -2.2 -5.8 -4.8 -3.3 
Denmark 0.4 0.1 2.1 5.2 5.2 4.8 3.2 -2.7 -2.5 -1.8 
Germany  -3.8 -4.2 -3.8 -3.3 -1.6 0.2 -0.1 -3.1 -4.1 -0.8 
Estonia 0.3 1.7 1.6 1.6 2.5 2.4 -2.9 -2.0 0.2 1.1 
Ireland -0.4 0.4 1.4 1.7 2.9 0.1 -7.4 -13.9 -30.9 -13.4 
Greece -4.8 -5.6 -7.5 -5.2 -5.7 -6.5 -9.8 -15.6 -10.7 -9.4 
Spain -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 1.3 2.4 1.9 -4.5 -11.2 -9.7 -9.4 
France -3.1 -4.1 -3.6 -2.9 -2.3 -2.7 -3.3 -7.5 -7.1 -5.2 
Italy -3.1 -3.6 -3.5 -4.4 -3.4 -1.6 -2.7 -5.4 -4.5 -3.9 
Cyprus -4.4 -6.6 -4.1 -2.4 -1.2 3.5 0.9 -6.1 -5.3 -6.3 
Latvia -2.3 -1.6 -1.0 -0.4 -0.5 -0.4 -4.2 -9.8 -8.1 -3.4 
Lithuania -1.9 -1.3 -1.5 -0.5 -0.4 -1.0 -3.3 -9.4 -7.2 -5.5 
Luxembourg 2.1 0.5 -1.1 0.0 1.4 3.7 3.2 -0.8 -0.8 -0.3 
Hungary -9.0 -7.3 -6.5 -7.9 -9.4 -5.1 -3.7 -4.6 -4.4 4.3 
Malta -5.8 -9.2 -4.7 -2.9 -2.8 -2.3 -4.6 -3.9 -3.6 -2.7 
Netherlands -2.1 -3.1 -1.7 -0.3 0.5 0.2 0.5 -5.6 -5.1 -4.5 
Austria -0.7 -1.5 -4.4 -1.7 -1.5 -0.9 -0.9 -4.1 -4.5 -2.5 
Poland -5.0 -6.2 -5.4 -4.1 -3.6 -1.9 -3.7 -7.4 -7.9 -5.0 
Portugal -3.4 -3.7 -4.0 -6.5 -4.6 -3.1 -3.6 -10.2 -9.8 -4.4 
Romania -2.0 -1.5 -1.2 -1.2 -2.2 -2.9 -5.7 -9.0 -6.8 -5.5 
Slovenia -2.4 -2.7 -2.3 -1.5 -1.4 0.0 -1.9 -6.0 -5.7 -6.4 
Slovakia -8.2 -2.8 -2.4 -2.8 -3.2 -1.8 -2.1 -8.0 -7.7 -4.9 
Finland 4.2 2.6 2.5 2.9 4.2 5.3 4.4 -2.5 -2.5 -0.6 
Sweden -1.3 -1.0 0.6 2.2 2.3 3.6 2.2 -0.7 0.3 0.4 
United Kingdom -2.1 -3.4 -3.5 -3.4 -2.7 -2.8 -5.1 -11.5 -10.2 -7.8 
Iceland : : : 4.9 6.3 5.4 -13.5 -10.0 -10.1 -4.4 
Norway 9.3 7.3 11.1 15.1 18.5 17.5 18.8 10.6 11.2 13.6 
Croatia -4.1 -4.5 -4.3 -4.0 -3.0 -2.5 -1.4 -4.1 : : 
Source: Eurostat 
From the data presented in table 1, it can be observed that all EU 
members have violated the Maastricht treaty regarding budget deficit 
requirements in 2009-2011, namely every country regist red a deficit exceeding 
the benchmark of 3% of GDP. 
Greece, for example, registered the whole period a deficit above the 3% 
limit. Even after joining the EU, its budget deficit still remained 7.9% of GDP. In 
Ireland, during 2009-2011, the budget deficit surpassed nearly three times the 
limit imposed by the treaty, it reached the level of 13.9% in 2009 and sky 
rocketed to 30% of GDP in 2010. Regarding Spain, the deficit widened since 
2008, thus reaching its most significant level of 11% of GDP in 2009. Italy has 
registered problems since 2009 and reached the highst level of 7% this year.  
To mitigate budget deficits, EU states have reduced costs, on one hand, 
and increased some taxes, on the other hand. If in the period 2002-2007 the EU27 
public debt registered small fluctuations around the level of 50%, since 2007 it 
has sharply increase by approximately 20% (figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. The evolution of EU27 public debt  
Source: Based on Eurostat data 
The Eurostat data unravels that the most risky countries proved to be 
Greece, Italy, Ireland, Spain, and Portugal. These countries have the highest 
investment risk, their public debt has grown rapidly in recent years and they 
continue to accumulate additional debt due to large budget deficits. The highest 
degree of leverage in the EU is towards Greece, i.e., 119.2% of GDP, followed by 
Italy with 101.6% of GDP. 
 
Figure 2. The evolution of Spain’s public debt  
Source: based on Eurostat data 
 
As figure 2 shows, Spain registered a sharp rise in public debt from 
almost 29% of GDP in 2007 to around 60% of GDP in 2011.  
 
Figure 3. The evolution of Portugal’s public debt 
Source: based on Eurostat data 
From figure 3, one can see that, in Portugal, the maxi um level of debt 
was registered in 2010, with about 80% of GDP, while in 2011 it slightly 
decreased to 70% of GDP. 
More and more countries have a debt above 60% of GDP, thus 
increasing tension within financial markets and also investment risk. In recent 
years, even countries with stronger economies like Germany, France, or UK 
surpassed the safety limit, as shown by the following graphs. 
 
Figure 4. The evolution of Germany’s public debt 
Source: based on Eurostat data 
 
Germany is close to the maximum level of public debt under the Treaty 
of Maastricht, which is 60% of GDP (figure 4).  
 
Figure 5. The evolution of France’s public debt 
Source: based on Eurostat data 
 
Based on figure 5, France has exceeded the maximum level of public 
debt by almost 15 %. 
 
Figure 6. The evolution of UK’s public debt 
Source: based on Eurostat data 
 
UK also has faced an increase in public debt, especially after the 
nationalization of Northern Rock bank in 2007. 
Another group of countries are those with an averag indebtedness level, 
ranging from 40% to 60% of GDP. These countries have managed to keep public 
debt under control: Czech Republic, Denmark, Poland, Sweden. 
 
Figure 7. The evolution of Czech Republic’s public debt 
Source: based on Eurostat data 
 
In Czech Republic, the level went from a minimum of 15% of GDP in 
2002 to 35% of GDP in 2011. In our opinion, since 2003, the country could not 
be considered as having a low level of indebtedness. 
 
Figure 8. The evolution of Poland’s public debt 
Source: based on Eurostat data 
As for Poland, the level of public debt remained unchanged for the last 
two years of study, i.e., 45% of GDP. 
The least indebted countries are those with a ratiobel w 20% of GDP. 
Among them are Estonia and Luxembourg. Romania alsoqualifies for this 
category, with an average public debt. 
 
Figure 9. The evolution of Estonia’s public debt 
Source: based on Eurostat data 
 
Figure 9 shows that debt rate in Estonia, though varying over the 
reporting period, does not exceed 18% of GDP, turning Estonia into a low 
gearing country. 
 
Figure 10. The evolution of Luxembourg’s public debt 
Source: based on Eurostat data 
 
From figure 10, one can observe that, until 2007, Luxembourg had a 
very small public debt, closely to zero. The maximum level of debt was registered 




Both debtor and creditor countries have been actively involved in 
searching for alternative solutions in order to solve the increasing public debt 
problem, especially the foreign debt issue. 
Theory along with practice account that, for all governments, state loans 
were the only method of minimizing the effects of a financial crisis and covering 
extraordinary investment and consumption outlays. This method was also 
implemented by Romanian governments over time.  
The blame for the sovereign debt crisis can be attribu ed to: 1) 
irresponsible fiscal policies implemented by some EU members, which sharply 
increased public debts; 2) imprudent bank lending strategies, which fueled asset 
bubbles and housing bubbles; 3) large-scale actions taken to save the banking 
sector, all funded by taxpayers; 4) fragility of the global financial system.  
One of the important features of the sovereign debt crisis is the 
widespread phenomenon of financial contagion. This phenomenon could be 
defined as a situation in which financial instability of a market, an institution or a 
country is passed on to one or more markets, institutions and countries. A country 
with a poor fiscal situation can trigger contagion across countries with which it 
has economic ties. In the EU and moreover in the Euro zone, interconnection is 
stronger, therefore contagion might have a higher sp ed and a greater magnitude. 
Throughout history, many countries poorly supervised their public debt 
ratio, fact which fuelled or spread crises. The uninsp red structure could be 
attributed to: wrong maturities; interest rates; the currency in which the loan is 
contracted; the existence of governmental collateral. 
As shown by the data presented, all EU member states have disregarded 
the Maastricht Treaty by exceeding, in 2009-2011, the benchmark budget deficit 
of 3% of GDP. To reduce budget deficits, EU member states have benefited from 
guidance and the aim would be achieved during the interval 2011-2014. Another 
treaty requirement has also been disregarded by all members, which have 
exceeded the maximum 60% of GDP level regarding public debt.   
Any political or institutional solution given to the sovereign debt crisis 
should address the issue of debt reduction, without jeopardizing the objectives of 
the European Economic Recovery Program. One possible way of achieving this 
might be by combining the process of debt reduction with an increase in the 
investment in order to counterbalance the deflationry effects of debt reduction. 
The sovereign debt crisis requires both a political and a financial 
solution, because it has raised concerns regarding the fairness and transparency of 
financial arrangements aimed at ensuring the stability of the single currency, the 
Euro. 
If, during the banking crisis, it was often said that some banks were “too 
big to be allowed to fail”, nowadays we refer to member states faced with rising 
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